On November 5, Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone agreed to acquire 100% of Evos B.V., a Dutch-based operator of eight liquid storage terminals, at an enterprise value of €2.56 billion (about $2.88 billion). Enterprise value is the price of the whole business before sorting out who holds the debt and who holds the equity. The terms offer a clear look at how a buyer prices earnings it considers durable, and at the conditions that sit between a signed agreement and a closed one.
Evos had 2025 revenue of €392 million and EBITDA of €219 million, a margin of about 56%. EBITDA, short for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, is the most common shorthand for a company's operating cash earnings. The terminals averaged 99% commercial occupancy and handled 37 million metric tonnes last year, across sites in the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Malta.
Dividing the reported enterprise value by 2025 EBITDA gives an implied multiple of about 11.7 times. That figure is our calculation, not one the parties reported. The equity value is €1.18 billion, which implies roughly €1.4 billion of debt and other claims ranked ahead of the owners. Funds managed by Igneo Infrastructure Partners are among the sellers, so this is a financial owner selling to a strategic buyer, meaning a company that will operate the assets alongside its own.
One detail deserves a careful reading. A report on October 30 described a binding Adani bid of about $3.3 billion for Evos during a competitive sale process, while the announced enterprise value is about $2.88 billion. Public reports do not explain the difference, which may reflect how debt and other items were counted. The practical lesson for any seller is to ask every bidder to state its price on the same basis, with a written bridge from headline number to cash received.
A 56% margin and 99% occupancy describe a business whose revenue is both high and predictable. Buyers pay multiples for confidence in the next five years of cash flow, not just the last twelve months. When nearly every unit of capacity is already in use, and the assets are hard to replicate because of permitting, port access, and capital cost, the buyer faces less uncertainty about volume and pricing. Less uncertainty supports a higher multiple.
Owners of smaller companies rarely run terminals, but the same logic applies in ordinary businesses. Recurring contracts, high retention, steady margins, and a customer base that is not concentrated in a handful of accounts all shorten the list of things a buyer must worry about. Each item removed from that list tends to show up in price or in the amount of cash paid at closing.
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group is the sole underwriter of the acquisition debt, with commitments of up to €2.8 billion, which exceeds the enterprise value. Underwritten, committed financing reduces the chance that a buyer cannot fund the purchase after signing, and sellers generally value that certainty alongside price. A lower bid with firm funding can be worth more to a seller than a higher bid that depends on lenders who have not yet committed.
In the middle market, financing has been tighter. Mercer Capital's fall 2026 review, drawing on GF Data, reported that average total debt on platform buyouts fell from 3.4 times EBITDA in the first quarter to 2.9 times in the second. When lenders offer less, buyers fund more with equity, and sellers should ask early how a bidder plans to pay and what is already in writing.

The Evos agreement is subject to regulatory approvals and to works council consultation. A works council is an employee representative body that European law often requires a company to consult before an ownership change. Neither step is unusual, but both take time, and until they finish, the sellers do not have their money.
Domestic owners face their own versions of this gap: antitrust review for larger transactions, lender and landlord consents, customer contract assignments, and licensing transfers. The terms that govern the period between signing and closing, including termination rights and any outside date, often matter as much as the headline price. A seller should map these steps before accepting an offer, not after.
It would be a mistake to take 11.7 times and apply it to a smaller company. GF Data's average for U.S. private equity-backed deals with enterprise values between $10 million and $500 million was 7.0 times in the second quarter of 2026, and about 7.2 times on a trailing twelve-month basis. Mercer's data put strategic buyers at an average of 8.5 times in the first half of 2026 against 7.2 times for financial buyers. The Evos price sits well above those figures because of the asset's scale, margin, occupancy, and scarcity, not because the market as a whole has moved.
The comparison is still useful as a map of what earns a premium. A strategic buyer can often pay more where it can fit an asset into an existing network, and an owner who identifies those buyers early gives a sale process more ways to produce a higher price.
Buyers appear willing to pay for earnings that look durable even as overall deal volume stays uneven. The next signals are the regulatory and works council steps for Evos, any change to the terms before closing, and whether lenders extend more credit to middle-market platforms in the coming quarters. Those developments will indicate whether financing certainty remains a deciding factor in competitive sales.
The Evos transaction shows a buyer paying about 11.7 times EBITDA for high-margin, fully occupied assets, with committed financing and several approvals still to come. Owners can draw three practical points: durable earnings command higher multiples, certainty of funds deserves weight next to price, and the steps between signing and closing belong in the negotiation from the start.