Why Private Equity Keeps Buying Trade Shows

Private equity firms have put roughly $6 billion into the world's largest trade show organizers so far in 2026, according to an October 1 tally from Skift Meetings, and six of the top 20 operators are now PE-owned, up from four in 2023. The pattern matters well beyond the events industry, because it shows what buyers mean when they say they want durable revenue and what an owner in any sector can do to earn the same treatment.

What buyers paid this year

Two transactions anchor the trend. On June 2, Hellman & Friedman agreed to buy Hyve Group, a UK-based organizer of 31 events across 18 brands, from Providence Equity Partners and Searchlight Capital Partners for a reported $1.8 billion. Press reports put the price at about 12.9 times estimated 2026 EBITDA, which stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization and serves as the standard shorthand for operating profit. Hyve generated roughly $100 million of EBITDA on $391 million of revenue in 2025, and about $140 million is expected for 2026. The sellers had taken Hyve private in 2023 for £524 million, so they are exiting about three years later.

In May, Apollo agreed to acquire Emerald Holding for about $1.5 billion, or $5.03 per share in cash, a 42% premium to the share price at announcement. Apollo will merge Emerald with Questex, a second events and media company it is also acquiring, to form a platform of roughly 160 trade shows, conferences, and content-driven events across North America. Onex, which held more than 90% of Emerald's shares, committed to vote in favor, which removed most of the shareholder-approval risk.

The performance data buyers point to is straightforward. Skift reports that PE-owned organizers grew revenue 11.4% in 2025, compared with 7.2% for competitors owned by other institutions. That comparison is worth reading with some care, since sponsors choose which companies to buy and tend to choose the stronger ones. Even so, the gap helps explain why investment committees are comfortable paying a full multiple.

What the buyers say they are paying for

The stated thesis is that a physical marketplace is difficult to substitute. In the words Skift attributes to investors, AI cannot replace a show floor. A trade show puts buyers and sellers in the same place on fixed dates, and the organizer earns fees from exhibitors, sponsors, and attendees who return year after year because the other side of the market will be there. Coverage of the Hyve deal quotes a Hellman & Friedman partner describing the asset as a portfolio of irreplaceable commercial moments, now supported by AI-driven matchmaking that schedules one-to-one meetings between buyers and exhibitors.

Strip away the industry detail and the underlying logic is familiar to anyone who has sold a business. A buyer underwrites cash flow it believes will continue, and it pays more when the reasons for continuation are specific and observable. Repeat customers, annual contracts or events, multiple brands that spread risk, and a service that a customer cannot easily rebuild in-house all make the forecast more believable. Technology disruption is the risk buyers are most focused on right now, and a business that can explain why its revenue is insulated from it earns a better reception.

Scale is the second ingredient. Apollo is not buying two companies and leaving them side by side; it is combining them, which lets it spread overhead, cross-sell to a larger customer list, and present a single larger platform to a future buyer. For owners of smaller businesses, this is the add-on logic that drives many middle-market transactions: a company that is modest on its own can be worth more to a platform that already has the infrastructure to absorb it.

What diligence will test

Sponsors that pay a full multiple verify the story before closing. In financial due diligence, a buyer commissions a quality of earnings analysis, which stress-tests reported profit to separate sustainable earnings from one-time items. For a business like an events organizer, the questions are concrete. How many customers returned from the prior year, and how much of this year's revenue was already contracted before the year began? How concentrated is revenue among the top ten exhibitors or sponsors? What does each event earn on its own once shared costs are allocated? And how much cash arrives as deposits ahead of the event, which affects the working capital the buyer expects to receive at closing?

The same coverage is candid about weak points. TSNN notes long-running complaints about hosted-buyer programs, including no-shows and economics that favor one side of the market. A buyer will find those issues in diligence if they exist, and a seller who has already measured them can present them with context instead of defending them under pressure.

What this means for an owner outside the events industry

The practical lesson is that durability has to be demonstrated with data, not asserted. An owner who tells a buyer that customers are loyal is making a claim; an owner who shows three years of retention by customer cohort, the share of revenue under multi-year agreements, and the margin on each product line is giving the buyer something it can put in a model. The second owner is more likely to receive a higher multiple and a quicker path through diligence.

It also helps to be realistic about price. A reported 12.9 times EBITDA applies to a business with about $100 million of EBITDA, a growth outlook, and a sponsor with a larger strategy behind it. Smaller companies generally trade at lower multiples. The factors that moved this valuation, which were growth, repeat revenue, scale, and a credible answer to technology risk, are the same ones that move a lower-middle-market valuation, and they are within an owner's ability to improve over the two or three years before a sale.

What to watch next

Three developments are worth following. The first is whether the next PE acquisitions among the top 20 organizers come at multiples near Hyve's, which would show whether sponsors are paying for scarcity or are starting to meet resistance on price. The second is the integration of Emerald and Questex, since combined platforms must deliver the cost and revenue benefits that justified the premium. The third is whether sponsors apply the same durable-revenue screen to other physical-network businesses, such as industrial distribution, specialty services, and franchise systems, where a similar argument about resistance to automation can be made.