On September 22, 2026, Progress Software closed a $400 million cash purchase of what Domo itself described as "substantially all" of its assets and certain of its liabilities. Domo's data platform, its more than 2,400 business customers, its technology, and its employees all moved to Progress. What did not move was Domo, the public company. It kept trading, kept its board, and kept roughly $900 million in tax losses that a different kind of deal would have put at risk.
The gap between what changed hands and what stayed behind is the entire lesson here, and it applies just as much to a founder selling one division of a closely held company as it does to a Nasdaq-listed seller.
On paper, this reads like a straightforward acquisition. Progress, a software company, wanted Domo's AI and data platform capabilities and the customer base that came with them. Domo, after what its board chair called a comprehensive review of strategic alternatives, agreed to sell. The agreement was announced in July 2026 and closed roughly two months later, funded by Progress with cash and its existing revolving credit facility. Domo's controlling shareholder, founder and CEO Josh James, gave written consent in place of a full shareholder vote, which is common when one holder controls enough of the stock to approve a transaction on the company's behalf.
None of that is unusual for a technology acquisition of this size. What is unusual is what Domo chose to keep, and why.
There are two common ways to sell a company: sell the stock (or merge the company into the buyer, which has the same practical effect), or sell the assets while the corporate entity remains standing. A stock sale is often simpler to execute and is frequently what buyers prefer, because the target's contracts, licenses, and history usually carry over without needing to be individually reassigned. An asset sale takes more work: each contract, lease, and permit generally has to be identified and either assigned to the buyer or left behind, and liabilities have to be sorted into what the buyer is assuming and what the seller keeps.
Domo and Progress did the harder version on purpose. Progress picked up the operating business, the customer contracts, the intellectual property, and the employees. Domo held on to its net cash position of roughly $246 million, or about $4.84 per share, along with certain tax attributes the deal was structured to protect. That protection is the reason an asset sale made sense here even though it required more work to put together.
Domo's most valuable retained asset is not on a typical list of things worth negotiating over: more than $900 million in net operating loss carryforwards, built up over years in which the company spent more than it earned. Under federal tax rules, a company can generally use those accumulated losses to offset future taxable income, which is real value to whoever ends up controlling the entity that holds them. But that value is fragile. If ownership of the company changes hands beyond certain thresholds, in a merger or a large stock sale, the tax code sharply limits how much of the loss carryforward can be used going forward, sometimes to the point of making it nearly worthless.
An asset sale sidesteps that problem because the company itself, and its ownership, does not change. Progress bought the business Domo ran, not the corporate entity Domo is. Domo's stockholders still own the same shares in the same company after closing that they owned before. The operating business is gone, but the shell, and the tax attributes inside it, survived intact. That is a deliberate piece of structuring, not an accident of paperwork.

Domo will keep trading under a new name and ticker, run by the same CEO with board oversight. According to the company's own statements, the plan is to look for ways to put those loss carryforwards to work, whether through new operations, an acquisition that can use the tax shield, or eventually returning capital to shareholders. In effect, Domo converted an operating software company into something closer to a holding company with cash, a clean balance sheet, and a valuable tax asset, and left the harder question of what to build next for a later decision.
Few KAS clients are sitting on nine-figure loss carryforwards, but the underlying logic scales down cleanly. An owner selling one division while keeping another, a company isolating a liability-heavy legacy contract before a sale, or a founder who wants to keep the entity alive to pursue a different business afterward are all facing the same fork Domo faced: sell the stock and the company goes with it, or sell the assets and decide, deliberately, what stays behind. That decision belongs early in a deal, before a letter of intent is signed, because it shapes everything from the tax bill to who is on the hook for what liabilities to how much diligence and paperwork the closing requires.
The Domo transaction is a useful reference point precisely because the company was public and had to explain its reasoning in filings. Most private sellers never spell out this thinking in writing, but the same tradeoffs are sitting underneath nearly every deal of any size.
Domo sold its operating business for $400 million and kept its public shell alive specifically to protect roughly $900 million in tax losses that a merger would have jeopardized. The choice between selling stock and selling assets is not a technicality left to lawyers at the end of a deal. It determines what a seller keeps, what a buyer inherits, and how much value survives the transaction on either side. Any owner heading toward a sale, whether of a whole company or one part of it, should have this conversation with an advisor before structure gets baked into a term sheet, not after.