On September 14, The Baldwin Group agreed to be taken private by Sequence Holdings, a permanent holding company backed by venture capital, and DFO Management, the family office of Dell Technologies founder Michael Dell. Shareholders will receive $32.50 per share in cash, an enterprise value of about $7.7 billion. According to the Financial Times, the consortium prevailed over several large private equity firms. That detail matters more than the price. A buyer that does not raise funds, does not sell on a schedule, and pitches engineering talent alongside capital just won a competitive auction, and owners further down the market are starting to hear from the same kind of buyer.
Baldwin is a Tampa-based commercial insurance broker that went public in 2019 and completed 35 acquisitions in roughly two and a half years after the IPO. That pace pushed its leverage to 5.8 times earnings by 2022, and the company spent the next several years paying down debt before returning to acquisitions with the $1.03 billion purchase of CAC Group earlier this year. Second-quarter revenue rose 30 percent to $492.9 million, mostly from CAC. Organic growth was 2 percent. Adjusted EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, with one-time items removed) reached $116.7 million, and net leverage stood at about 4.5 times.
The $7.7 billion enterprise value breaks into roughly $4.6 billion of equity and $3.1 billion of net debt that the buyers will assume or refinance. Baldwin says that is about 20 times trailing twelve-month adjusted EBITDA of $396 million. The buyers will acquire a majority interest. Eligible Baldwin employees who hold equity can roll a portion of it into the private company and keep what the press release calls a significant minority stake. A special committee of independent directors, advised by Perella Weinberg and Potter Anderson, negotiated the deal and recommended it unanimously. There is no financing condition. Closing is expected in the first quarter of 2027, after a shareholder vote and regulatory approvals.
DFO Management manages the investment assets of Michael Dell and his family. It began as MSD Capital in 1998 and helped finance the $24.4 billion buyout of Dell Technologies in 2013. In his statement, Dell drew the contrast directly: DFO invests with the flexibility of permanent capital, not as a fund working against a fixed exit clock.
Sequence Holdings is newer. It launched this year, has raised about $75 million from 8VC, Conviction, and Lux Capital, and describes itself as a permanent holding company that acquires established service businesses and rebuilds their operations around AI, using engineers recruited from firms such as Palantir, Scale AI, and Apple. Its only prior investment was a minority stake in BankSouth, a Georgia community bank. Baldwin is its first control transaction. DFO is investing directly in the deal and is also becoming an investor in Sequence itself.
Put those two together and you have a buyer that looks nothing like a private equity fund. There is no ten-year fund life, no limited partners waiting for distributions, and no requirement to sell in year five. There is also no track record at this size, which is its own consideration.
Twenty times trailing EBITDA is a full price for a broker growing organically at 2 percent, and it sits at the upper end of the range set by Aon's $17 billion purchase of USI two weeks earlier and Gallagher's $13.45 billion acquisition of AssuredPartners. Raymond James analysts put the same price at 12.8 times their estimate of Baldwin's 2027 adjusted EBITDA. The distance between 20 times and 12.8 times is the buyers' underwriting: they expect earnings to grow substantially over the next two years, and Sequence's pitch is that embedding engineers inside the business to rebuild workflows is how that happens.
A private equity fund underwrites a similar gap with leverage and a five-year horizon, and it needs the exit multiple to hold. A permanent holder can carry a higher entry multiple because it is not modeling a sale. It is modeling cash flow it intends to own for a long time, and it can spend the early years investing at the expense of near-term earnings without a fund clock penalizing the delay. That is the structural reason a family office can outbid a fund for the same asset, and why an offer from one should not be assumed to price like a private equity bid.
The 88 percent headline is measured against Baldwin's close on June 17, the day before reports surfaced that the company was exploring a sale. Against Friday's close, the premium is 9.6 percent. Against where the stock traded a year ago, the price is roughly flat. Baldwin's shares fell to $15.88 in February and climbed to a high of $32.59 in late August, nearly all of it on take-private speculation. The buyers are paying a large premium to a depressed price and a modest premium to a recovered one.
For a private owner, the lesson is about timing rather than arithmetic. Baldwin explored a sale when its stock was near a low, after years of deleveraging had left the equity thin relative to the debt above it. The market was pricing the company on its balance sheet. The buyers priced it on what the business could earn with a different capital structure and technology base. Owners who have paused growth to fix something are often valued on the paused version. A buyer with a longer horizon and its own operating thesis may see a different company.

The part of this deal that matters most for owners is the rollover. Baldwin has long had broad-based employee ownership, and the agreement lets eligible colleagues keep a portion of their equity in the private company. That is framed as continuity. It is also a change in what that equity is.
Public stock can be sold any day. Rolled equity in a private equity-backed company can be sold when the fund sells, typically within three to seven years, and the fund's own need for liquidity guarantees that day arrives. Rolled equity in a permanent holding company has neither feature. If the owner never intends to sell, the path to cash for a minority holder has to be written into the documents: a put right to sell back to the company at an appraised value after a set period, a distribution policy, participation in any future recapitalization, or tag-along rights if the majority ever does sell. None of those exist by default. They exist if someone negotiates them before signing.
The same applies to governance. A fund answers to limited partners. A family office answers to a family, and a venture-backed holding company answers to its own investors and a thesis about AI. Minority holders should know who decides on future acquisitions, additional leverage, and executive changes, and what protections they hold if those decisions go against them.
Baldwin's board handled the insider question the way public company rules require. Because management and existing holders are staying in, a special committee of independent directors with its own advisers negotiated the price, and the participants will file a Schedule 13E-3, the going-private disclosure that lays out the fairness analysis. Private companies have no such requirement, but the discipline is worth borrowing. When some owners cash out and others roll, a fairness opinion, or at minimum a valuation from someone not paid on the deal, protects everyone from the claim that the rollover terms favored insiders.
Baldwin's proxy statement and Schedule 13E-3 will disclose how many bidders participated, how the special committee weighed the consortium against fund offers, and what the rollover terms actually say. That filing will be the first detailed look at how a permanent-capital buyer structures liquidity for the minority it invites to stay. Beyond Baldwin, watch for family offices and holding-company acquirers at smaller scale. The model Sequence is testing on a $7.7 billion broker was built for the service businesses that fill the middle market, and the pitch of patient capital plus engineers who rebuild your operations will reach owners of $20 million companies before long.
The Baldwin deal is a data point on a change in who buys companies. A family office and a venture-backed holding company paid 20 times trailing EBITDA, roughly 12.8 times forward, for a broker growing 2 percent organically, and beat private equity funds to do it. They could pay that price because they are not modeling an exit, and they are asking Baldwin's employee owners to roll equity into a company that may never sell. For owners, three things follow. A permanent-capital buyer can price a business on a longer view than a fund and may see value a fund cannot underwrite. Rolled equity in a company with no exit clock is only as liquid as the rights negotiated before closing. And the premium in this deal came from competition, so the way to find out what a permanent-capital buyer will really pay is to make it bid against everyone else.