Bloomberg reported this week that firms including Apollo and Bain are moving into a corner of the market most business owners have never heard of: lending money to other private equity firms, secured by the portfolio companies those firms already own. The demand is coming from buyout funds under pressure to return cash to investors who have been waiting a long time for it. For an owner who sold a company to a sponsor and rolled part of the proceeds back into the deal, this is not background noise. It is leverage that can sit above your remaining stake.
A NAV loan is a borrowing at the fund level, secured by the fund's net asset value, meaning the aggregate value of every company the fund owns rather than the assets of any single one. A sponsor with ten portfolio companies worth $2 billion in total might borrow $200 million to $400 million against that pool. Loan-to-value ratios generally run between 40 percent and 60 percent of fund net asset value, though most facilities are written well below the ceiling.
The mechanics matter because they differ from the form of leverage owners already know. In a dividend recapitalization, the portfolio company itself borrows and pays the proceeds up to its shareholders. The debt lands on the company's balance sheet, shows up in its covenants, and constrains its operations directly. A NAV loan does none of that. It sits one level up, at the fund, and it is repaid from exit proceeds as portfolio companies are sold.
That structural difference produces a specific consequence for a minority holder. Your company's financial statements will not show the loan. Your credit agreement will not reference it. But when the fund eventually sells your company, a portion of the proceeds that would otherwise flow through the waterfall may go first to repaying a facility you never signed and were never asked to approve.
The pressure is arithmetic. Private equity sponsors deployed $461 billion in the first half of 2026, down 10.6 percent from the same period last year, according to a mid-year report released on August 21. Deployment is not the constraint, though. Realization is. Funds raised in 2019 through 2021 are holding companies well past their intended hold periods, and the investors in those funds, mostly pensions, endowments, and insurance companies, have been receiving distributions at a pace that falls short of what they modeled.
NAV financing solves that problem without requiring a sale. The fund borrows against the portfolio, distributes the proceeds to investors, and repays the facility later out of exit proceeds. Distributions look healthier. Reported returns improve, at least on the measures that count cash received. The underlying companies are still unsold.
The market has grown accordingly. NAV financing outstanding sits somewhere between $100 billion and $150 billion, with industry forecasts pointing toward $600 billion to $700 billion by 2030. Fund finance as a whole crossed $1 trillion this year. Roughly 72 percent of participants in a recent survey expect moderate to significant growth in institutional NAV lending during 2026, which would make it the fastest-growing segment of fund finance. Pricing has come down as capital has entered: the bulk of margins now fall in a 4 percent to 7 percent band over the reference rate, with weighted-average targets near 520 basis points for secured facilities, roughly 40 basis points tighter than a year ago.
Cheaper money attracts more borrowers. That is the part worth watching.

Rolling equity has become close to standard in middle market sales. A sponsor buys 70 percent or 80 percent of your company, you reinvest part of your proceeds alongside them, and you participate in what the industry calls the second bite: the gain on your remaining stake when the sponsor exits in four to six years. The pitch is that your second bite can rival your first.
Fund-level leverage changes the shape of that outcome in three ways.
First, it can affect the timing of your exit. A sponsor carrying a NAV facility has a repayment obligation that does not exist in an unlevered fund. Depending on the maturity and the covenants, that can push toward selling assets sooner than a purely value-driven timetable would suggest, or in a weaker market than the sponsor would otherwise choose. Your stake gets sold when the fund needs liquidity, not necessarily when your company is at its best.
Second, it can affect what you receive. Facilities are typically secured by the equity interests the fund holds in its portfolio companies, and repayment comes off the top of exit proceeds at the fund level. Whether that reduces your distribution depends entirely on where your rolled equity sits: directly in the operating company, in a holding company beneath the pledge, or in a vehicle that is itself part of the collateral pool. That is a document question, and it has a clear answer if someone reads for it.
Third, it affects information. Limited partners in these funds have complained for years about limited visibility into when NAV facilities are used and on what terms. The Institutional Limited Partners Association issued guidance recommending that sponsors seek approval from the limited partner advisory committee before putting a facility in place absent clear authority in the fund documents, and that they disclose the facility's size, structure, security, covenants, rationale, and any conflicts. Rollover holders in portfolio companies sit outside that framework entirely. Nothing requires anyone to tell you.
None of this argues against rolling equity. It argues for asking a short set of questions while you still have leverage, which is before signing, not after.
The answers tell you something beyond the financing question. A sponsor in year seven of a 2019 vintage fund with six companies still on the books is under a different kind of pressure than one deploying a fund raised last year. That pressure will shape how your company is run and when it is sold, and it is knowable before you commit.
Three developments will determine how much this matters. The first is whether distributions actually recover. Forecasts point to distribution rates rising meaningfully in 2026 and continuing into 2027 and 2028. If exits normalize, the pressure to manufacture liquidity through borrowing eases on its own.
The second is regulatory attention. NAV lending has drawn scrutiny over whether facilities used to fund distributions present returns in a misleading light, since money borrowed against a portfolio and paid out looks similar to money earned from selling something. Any move toward standardized disclosure would help rollover holders indirectly.
The third is credit conditions. Dividend recapitalization issuance in the leveraged loan market ran $74.3 billion in 2025 before falling sharply in the first quarter of 2026. When the company-level route closes, the fund-level route gets more traffic. Watching one tells you something about the other.
Fund-level borrowing is now a permanent feature of private equity, and it operates in a layer of the structure that middle market sellers rarely examine. If you are selling to a sponsor and rolling equity, the debt on your own balance sheet is no longer the whole leverage picture. Ask where your stake sits relative to any fund-level facility, ask what the fund's vintage and remaining portfolio look like, and get information rights written into the shareholders agreement rather than assuming you will hear about it. The second bite is real, and it is worth protecting from claims you cannot see.